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Abstract: 
 
 This paper presents a model of the firm that includes the possibility of firm and employee-
on-the-job decision making based on alternatives to profit and utility maximization.  Such 
alternatives are relevant and significant when explaining firm activity in cultural environments in 
which self interest is not considered to be a primary force driving human behavior.  Three types of 
firms are defined and their properties compared: the Western firm, the Japanese firm, and the clan.  
The third is a combination of the first two. 
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Cultural Variation in the Theory of the Firm1 
 
In explaining firm behavior, economists focus on what seems to be the most important 
features of economic reality to secure the building blocks their models.  In the case of Western 
firms, this has led to the postulation of such elements as production functions with their attendant 
properties, and the pursuit of maximization by firms as the motivating force that drives the 
determination of their behaviors.  (The use of the term “maximization” here is intended to be quite 
general, covering both the long and short runs, and including the maximization or minimization of 
an appropriate objective function, with or without constraint, under conditions of either certainty or 
uncertainty.)  Since it is not possible, given the limits of the experimental laboratory that 
economists have at their disposal, to confirm the veracity of  such assumptions or even their 
implications (Caldwell [4, pp. 156-157],  Katzner [12, pp. 8-9]), they must, of necessity, be 
accepted on faith.  That faith, however, is still justifiable in terms of the cultural heritage of the 
particular subjects under investigation. 
The reason why culture plays a role here is that the forces that motivate real people are 
determined, to a considerable extent, by their cultural backgrounds (Katzner [14]).  And it is real 
people who make the decisions that guide the behavior of real firms.  Returning to the case of the 
West, one of the most important cultural components, at least in so far as economic analysis is 
concerned, is self interest.  That component was institutionalized at the center of certain Western 
cultures in the 17th century and spread to all of them, to one degree or another, shortly thereafter 
(Weber [17]). Indeed, it has become so fundamental in Western life and thought that self interest, in 
the form of postulates of rationality or maximization, is, today, quite naturally and readily accepted 
by economists in explanations of Western economic reality as the most important single force 
driving individual behavior (Katzner [11]). 
It follows from this that in places where self interest is not a significant component of 
cultural backgrounds, postulates of rationality have no place in explanations of firm behavior 
because the real people who make the decisions do not think in those terms.2 Such is the case, for 
example, with Japan (Katzner [11]).  Rather than pursue the maximization of profit (including, 
under conditions of perfect competition, the selection of a cost-minimizing input mix, the hiring of 
inputs to the point at which they are paid the values of their marginal products, and the production 
of output to equate marginal cost to output price), it has been claimed, among other things, that 
Japanese firms (i) hold service to the general community and the provision of social and economic 
benefits to their employees as their primary objectives (Abegglen and Stalk [1, pp. 199-203]), (ii) 
maintain close ties with certain suppliers, in part, by not seeking out supplies from other firms that 
may be cheaper (Gerlach [5], and Ito [8, pp. 177-196, 214-226]), (iii) frequently make investment 
decisions on the basis of keeping up with the competition so as to maintain their social status 
(Nakane [16, p. 90]), and (iv) pay employees according to seniority (not productivity) and tend not 
fire them during hard economic times when they would be fired were they working for Western 
firms (Nakane [16, pp. 15, 82-83]).  All of these characteristics are confluent with the well-known 
Japanese cultural values of loyalty, the honoring of the myriad of obligations that all (Japanese) 
people and institutions bear, and the maintenance of harmony within society (e.g., Benedict [2] and 
Nakane [16]). 
These are not the only differences between Western and Japanese firms that are attributable 
to cultural dissimilarities.  For, in addition to the owners and managers of Western firms, Western 
employees, too, are propelled in their behavior by self interest.  This means that a Western firm can 
not only offer its employees financial and other incentives to direct their activities, but also expect 
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that those incentives will elicit, to some significant degree, the desired outcome.  In Japan, 
however, where self interest is not the main spring of action, such incentive schemes are unlikely to 
be as successful. Rather, to draw forth desirable conduct, Japanese firms tend to rely more on a  
process of socialization of employees that appeals to the Japanese cultural values of loyalty, 
honoring obligations, and harmony, and which leaves employees wanting to do the “right” thing on 
their own. 
There have been a few efforts to incorporate some of these anti-profit- anti-utility-
maximization characteristics in the theory of the firm.  For  example, Blinder [3] presents a model 
in which the firm attempts to maximize both profit and employee welfare combined and which, as a 
consequence, leads it actually to maximize revenue as opposed to profit.  And Hay and Morris [7, 
Ch. 10] describe a model in which firm behavior is generated by aligning the growth of its inputs 
with the growth of the demand for its output.  In the latter case, although the model includes a 
particular notion of growth maximization, the focus on growth itself, with its obvious benefits to 
both  society and employees, nevertheless satisfies, to a considerable extent, characteristic (i) 
attributed to Japanese firms above.  But although profit and utility maximization are avoided as 
such, since both of these models still contain other forms of maximization by the firm, they do not 
provide a clean break with postulates of rationality.  And, as has been indicated above, those 
postulates are necessarily irrelevant in models that purport to explain the behavior of Japanese 
firms. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model of the firm that allows for movement away 
from postulates of rationality or maximization and that, therefore, would possibly be applicable in a 
country like Japan.  In particular, the model developed encompasses, as special cases, both firms 
that do rely on maximization in decision making, as well as those that do not.  For convenience, a 
specific subset of the firms in the model that rely on postulates of rationality for decision making 
are referred to as “Western firms,” while a subset of those whose decisions are based on some other 
criterion are called “Japanese firms.”  Formal definitions of these types of firms, along with a third 
type that combines certain elements of each, are provided in Section II.  The inclusion of three 
distinct kinds of firms in the same model in this way permits comparisons between them that would 
otherwise not be possible.  The particular contrasts that emerge relate to both structure and 
efficiency. 
 
I 
 
To account for an expanded range of cultural effects on the firm, attention will focus, in 
addition to outputs and inputs, on social interactions among its employees.  Although inclusion of 
the latter will require the introduction of variables that appear to be incapable of measurement, 
those variables will be handled according to techniques set forth by Katzner [9], [12].  The model 
itself is a variant of that originally proposed by Gintis and Katzner [6] and subsequently invoked by 
Katzner [10] to study the efficiency of organizational forms. 
Assume lines of authority in the firm are pyramidal so that every employee k 
(where ) has exactly one immediate superior or supervisor.  All employees except those 
at the bottom end of a line of authority in the pyramid have at least one subordinate.  Two or more 
employees with the same supervisor are co-workers.  Situated at the top of the pyramid is the 
director who is designated by the symbol 
Kk ,,1K=
0=k .  The director may also be thought of as a chief 
executive, board of directors, or as a combination of both. 
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Each employee  supplies labor time  to the firm.  During time supplied the 
employee performs activities  which are assumed to be independent of  and fall within the 
terms of his work arrangement.
0≠k kz
ka kz
3   These activities involve social interactions among employees and 
are limited by the technological imperatives of production.  It is not required that the  be  
quantifiable:  The only restrictions are that each “value” of be capable of distinct, discrete, 
verbal description, and that the set of activities, , over which  may range also be subject to 
similarly precise definition.  In addition to performing activities, each employee provides rules 
which constrain the activities (i.e., limit the activity sets) of all workers (not only immediate 
subordinates) below him in authority.  These rules are characterized in terms of the constraints they 
impose.  Thus, if k is above '  in authority and if  is a set of rules prescribed by k for , then 
 is defined as a subset of , or .  The furnishing of rules may be thought of as an 
activity which is independent of all other activities and singled out for special attention.  Rules may 
be so restrictive as to dictate exactly what must be done (i.e., select a single element from the 
employee’s activity set) or they may allow for considerable flexibility and choice.  Rules also have 
to be adapted to the technology of production and the capabilities of the individuals for whom they 
are intended.  Moreover, the collection of rules imposed on any employee  by all persons above 
him have to be consistent, that is,  must be nonempty, where the intersection is taken over 
all k above '  in authority.  Let denote the collection of sets of rules -- one set  for each 
person '  below him -- issued by person k.  When k has no subordinates, the symbol  has no 
meaning.  Write  and 
ka
ka
kA ka
k 'kkR 'k
'kkR 'kA '' kkk AR ⊆
'k
'kkk RI
k kr 'kkR
k kr
),,( 1 Kaaa K= ),,( 1 Krrr K= .  The director’s rules, , are presumed given. 0r
The output of the firm, x, depends on quantities of labor time and non-labor inputs 
purchased by the firm, as well as on rules for subordinates and activities (consistent with rules 
received from above) supplied by employees.  This production function may be written 
mathematically as 
 
(1) ),,,( razyfx = ,  
 
where  is an I-vector of quantities of  non-labor inputs and .  
Actually, since it only serves to limit the values that a can take on and does not affect output 
directly, r need not be listed as an argument of f.  But retaining r in the production function 
introduces no difficulties and at the same time provides convenience that is useful below.  In the 
currently standard textbook treatment, y and z are picked by the firm and a and r are ignored.  The 
present approach continues the selection of y and z by the firm.  But now a separate choice  is 
made for each value of the vector .  And, in addition, a and r themselves are determined 
through an independent decision process that engages only the firm’s employees.
),,( 1 Iyyy K= ),,( 1 Kzzz K=
),( zy
),( ra
4   Of  course, the 
choice of a and r reflects and describes the relevant social interactions among the employees of the 
firm.  Regardless, it will simplify matters to assume that the markets in which the firm buys its non-
labor inputs and sells its output are all perfectly competitive. 
Let the firm pay each employee k a wage w according to the “incentive” function5  
 
(2)                                           ,  ),( kk
k
k raWw =
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where .  Non-monetary incentives, such as the possibility of  promotion and the 
guaranteed long-term employment granted by many Japanese firms are not considered.  Moreover, 
it is possible for  to be a constant function associating the same wage to all  in its 
domain.  Constant incentive functions, of course, are consistent with the practice of paying the  
employee according to his seniority.  The firm’s profit function is  
Kk ,,1K=
kW ),( kk ra
 
(3)                     , ∑∑
==
−−=
K
k
kk
I
i
iix zwyprazyfprazy
11
),,,(),,,(π
 
where  denotes output price, and  the price of non-labor input i.  To keep matters simple, the 
director is assumed to be paid out of profit rather than  provided a wage. 
xp ip
In Western firms, the functions  frequently have the property, implicit in previous 
discussion, that those values of 
kW
),,,,,(),( 11 KK rraara KK=  that enhance the productivity or 
profitability of the firm are assigned a higher wage.  In that circumstance, however, suppose that 
for fixed values of , ,K , , y, and z, output is higher at  than at .  If  profit is 
also to be higher at , then it is necessary that the  be set so that the additional wages paid 
employees at  over those paid at  is less than the additional revenue received at 
.  Were this  not the case, then the most productive  need not be the most profitable, 
and hence moving to increase productivity might reduce profitability.  Formally, the collection of 
incentive functions 
xp 1p Ip )','( ra )'',''( ra
)','( ra kW
)','( ra )'',''( ra
)','( ra ),( ra
{ }kW , one for each employee Kk ,,1K= , is said to be profit efficient (Gintis 
and Katzner [6, p. 282], and Katzner [10, pp. 548, 549]) whenever  
 
                                         )'','',,()',',,( razyfrazyf ≥
if and only if  
  
                                        )'','',,()',',,( razyrazy ππ ≥ ,  
                                                                  
for all y, z, 'a , , ''a 'r  and ''r .  Profit efficient incentives, then, have the property that productivity 
increases due to changes in  always are translated into larger profit.  Note that, in addition to 
incentives which provide wage raises that are smaller than resulting revenue increments, all 
collections of constant incentive functions are also profit efficient. 
),( ra
According to the cultural distinctions drawn at the outset, there are two general possibilities 
for the selection of y and z by the firm.  On the one hand, Western firms choose y and z on the basis 
of profit maximization in relation to (3), given the  and values for , ,K , , a, and r.  For  
fixed , the consequences of these choices under standard assumptions imposed on the 
production function f in (1) are well-known and not repeated here.  On the other hand, nonWestern 
firms determine y and z given a and r according to some generally-non-profit-maximizing criterion 
that, for present purposes, is not necessary to specify.  For convenience it is assumed that those 
firms also take prices and ,K ,  as parameters.  With these latter parameters fixed, the 
relationship between selections of y and z and values of a and r in nonWestern firms may be 
summarized by the firm selection function  as follows:  
kW xp 1p Ip
),( ra
xp 1p Ip
fs
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(4)                                               .   ),(),( raszy f=
                                                            
Of course, the possibility that  might reflect profit maximization as a  special case has not been 
ruled out. 
fs
It is worth providing an example to illustrate how the function  might be determined.  
Consider the Japanese firm.  With  set, specific social interactions among employees obtain.  
Given those interactions, the hours each  employee supplies and the quantity of non-labor inputs 
with which he works impinge on his ability to fulfill his social and productive obligations and on  
the nature of the harmony present within the firm.  This, in turn, affects  overall cooperation and 
productivity.  Historically the firm has established  and become comfortable with a certain 
realization of harmony and a particular  ability among employees to fulfill obligations.  Suppose, 
then, that given any , the firm chooses y and z to maintain as much as possible that harmony  
and ability.  In this way, a  is determined for each . 
fs
),( ra
),( ra
),( zy ),( ra
There are also two general possibilities for the selection of ),,( 1 Kaaa K=  and 
 by the firm’s employees.  For both instances, assume employees choose values of 
the and  (subject to the constraints indicated below) independently of their selection of leisure 
time and consumption so that these latter selections may be ignored.  With respect to Western 
firms, let the utility function, , (assumed to exist) of employee k be written as 
),,( 1 Krrr K=
ka kr
ku
  
(5)                                         . ),,( kkk
k
k wrau=µ
 
Note that the appearance of  as an argument of  makes the role of incentives in employee 
decision making explicit.  However, substitution of (2) into (5) eliminates  and reduces (5) to 
kw
ku
kw
 
 (6)                                           .   ),( kk
k
k raU=µ
 
Suppose that the chosen value of ),,,,,(),( 11 KK rraara KK=  emerges uniquely from the 
simultaneous maximization of  by each employee ),( kk
k raU 0≠k , subject to the constraints that, 
as k varies, the  are consistent  with all rules imposed on k from above or, in other words, that  
is in  for every k, where the intersection is taken over all  above k in authority.  Such an 
 is called an internal equilibrium for the Western firm.  Thus, in the Western case, and given 
the director’s rules ,  is obtained from utility maximization,  is secured from profit 
maximization as described earlier, and the firm’s output and profit are determined from (1) and (3).  
The collection of all internal equilibria for the Western firm generated as the director’s rules vary is 
denoted by E.  Note that E contains  the internal equilibria arising when the director’s rules are such 
that they impose no effective constraints on the activities of any worker. 
ka ka
kkk R ''I 'k
),( ra
0r ),( ra ),( zy
For nonWestern firms, let each  be chosen by k in light of the given directoral rules 
 and some generally-non-utility-maximizing principle that is (in parallel to the selection of y and 
z by the nonWestern firm) left unspecified and is subject to the constraint that  is in  for 
each  k, where, once again, the intersection is taken over all  above k in authority.  As before, the 
),( kk ra
0r
ka kkk R ''I
'k
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possibility that  is determined from the maximization of a utility function like (6) is not 
precluded, and the selected  vector 
),( kk ra
),,,,,(),( 11 KK rraara KK=  is an internal equilibrium for the  
nonWestern firm.  The set of all such internal equilibria as the director’s  rules vary is identified by 
the same symbol E used earlier. 
 
II 
 
The model set out above encompasses, among other possibilities, two general kinds of 
firms: the profit-maximizing firm with utility-maximizing employees and the non-profit-
maximizing, non-utility-maximizing alternative.  In each case, the actual behavior of the firm in 
question rests, in addition to the input quantities selected by the firm, on the internal equilibrium 
chosen by its employees.  Also in each case, it is clear that the director (or board of directors) is 
unlikely to be indifferent among the options from which his respective employees choose.  Suppose 
the preferences of the director are represented by the utility function .  Of course, the 
director of the Western firm would prefer  to  whenever there exists a  such 
that 
),(0 raU
)','( ra )'',''( ra )ˆ,ˆ( zy
0)'','',,()',',ˆ,ˆ( >− razyrazy ππ  for all values of , and this  would be reflected in the 
nature of his .  The director of the nonWestern firm, however, would probably have different 
priorities.  For example, it has been pointed out above that Japanese firms take their primary 
objectives to be service to the community and the provision of social and economic benefits to their 
employees.  The Japanese director’s utility function might also be influenced by the socialization 
and consensus-building that normally takes place within the Japanese firm. 
),( zy
0U
In either the Western or nonWestern case, denote the firm’s target values of output and 
input as determined by the director by , , and Tx Ty Tz .  Assume the Western director obtains these 
targets as follows:  Find the profit-maximizing vector  corresponding to each internal 
equilibrium.  Then choose for  and 
),( zy
Ty Tz  those respective values of y and z that yield the greatest 
profit when accompanied by their associated internal equilibria.  The output target  is now 
secured upon substitution in (1).  Obviously, the  identified with  maximizes .  
For the nonWestern firm, the targets would be determined with respect to some generally-non-
profit-maximizing criterion.  In the Japanese firm, say, that criterion might have to do with the 
maintenance of both the firm’s social status and its past rate of growth.  Regardless, such targets 
would relate back to the firm’s internal equilibria through (1) and (4), and may interact with the 
director’s preferences among those equilibria as expressed in .  To analyze the role of the 
director’s preferences and targets in relation to firm behavior, additional concepts are needed. 
Tx
),( ra ),( TT zy 0U
0U
An employee , whose behavior is derived from utility maximization, is called 
incentive motivated (Gintis and Katzner [6, p. 282], and Katzner [10, p. 556]) if for all pairs of 
values  and  the numerical inequality 
0≠k
)','( kk ra )'',''( kk ra
 
                                        )'',''()','( kk
k
kk
k raWraW ≥
  
implies  
  
                                      . )'',''()','( kk
k
kk
k raUraU ≥
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Incentive motivation means that individual preferences are such that, upon the maximization of 
their utility functions, employees respond in the “same direction” as that of incentives.  This is the 
theoretical representation of self interest on the part of employees in Western and other firms.  That 
self interest, together with the proper structuring of incentive functions (not yet completely 
specified), is what permits those firms to harness, should they wish to do so, their employees to the 
engine of profit maximization. 
Now recall production function (1).  For employee 0≠k  consider any two  and 
 such that (i) output is at least as high using  in (1) instead of , and (ii)  
restricts all subordinates of k to subsets of their respective activity sets obtained under  on 
which output is at least as large as it is anywhere else in the  sets.  Other things being equal, 
then, the output associated with  can not be less than that associated with .  
Assume that all pairs of vectors  can be compared in this way, and that (i) and (ii) hold 
regardless of the activities performed by the remaining employees and regardless of the quantities 
of labor time and non-labor inputs hired by the firm.  Under these conditions, if  
)','( kk ra
)'',''( kk ra ka' ka '' kr '
kr ''
kr ''
)','( kk ra )'',''( kk ra
),( kk ra
 
                                                 , )'',''()','( kk
k
kk
k raWraW ≥
  
then  is referred to as non-decreasing (Katzner [10, p. 557]).  In other words, incentive 
functions are non-decreasing provided they are set so as to reward employees toward activities 
which do not decrease output.  Similarly, an employee k, whose behavior is derived from utility 
maximization, is said to internalize the worth of productivity
kW
6  when, under the same conditions, 
 
                                                . )'',''()','( kk
k
kk
k raUraU ≥
 
Thus, the employee’s preferences among pairs of vectors of activities and rules favor those that do 
not reduce output.  The reason for the introduction of this concept will become clear shortly. 
Finally, employee  internalizes the values of the firm provided that, with  a 
component of  and  a component of 
, he chooses  over  if and only if 
0≠k )','( kk ra
)',,',',,'()','( 11 KK rraara KK= )'',''( kk ra
)'',,'','',,''()'',''( 11 KK rraara KK= )','( kk ra )'',''( kk ra
 
                                               . )'',''()','( 00 raUraU ≥
                                                               
The presence of this property among all of the firm’s employees may be interpreted to mean that a 
socialization process takes place within the firm that leaves employees always prepared to select 
those activities and rules that are consistent with the director’s preferences.  In general, such 
choices do not reflect postulates of rationality since they involve neither the employees’ own utility 
functions (preferences) nor their maximization.  However, internalizing the worth of productivity 
may still be viewed as the special case of internalizing the values of the firm in which  (i) the 
director has preferences that always lean towards increased output, (ii) the director and employee 
utility functions are consistent in the sense that, for all  and , )','( ra )'',''( ra
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                                                           )'',''()','( 00 raUraU ≥
 
if and only if 
 
                                                       )'',''()','( kk
k
kk
k raUraU ≥
 
for every k, and (iii) the  are maximized to determine the employees’ choices of . kU ),( kk ra
It is now possible to give full definitions of the notions of Western and Japanese firms.  
Like the standard characterization of perfect competition, these may be thought of as “ideal types” 
which do not usually appear in reality exactly as pictured, but which are useful for study 
nonetheless.  A firm is called Western provided that both it and its employees make decisions 
(including the setting of targets) on the basis of, respectively, profit and utility maximization, all 
incentive functions  (where ) are non-decreasing and (as a group) profit efficient, and all 
employees ( ) are incentive motivated.
kW 0≠k
0≠k 7   It is referred to as Japanese whenever profit and 
utility maximization do not guide (respectively) the firm and its employees in their decision 
making, all incentive functions are constant functions (and hence profit efficient), and all 
employees ( ) internalize the values of the firm.  These definitions capture and formalize the 
essence of the concepts of Western and Japanese firms, along with the cultural differences they 
reflect, suggested in earlier discussion. 
0≠k
A third type of firm is useful for comparative purposes.  A clan (Ouchi [15, p. 132]) is a 
firm in which all decisions (including the setting of targets) of employees and firm are, 
respectively, utility- and profit-maximizing, all incentive functions are constant functions (and 
hence profit-efficient), and all employees ( 0≠k ) internalize the worth of productivity.8  Evidently, 
the clan is a hybrid containing elements of both Western and Japanese firms in which utility and 
profit maximization are taken from the former, and the special instance of internalizing the values 
of the firm, namely, internalizing the worth of productivity, comes from the latter.  That is, the clan 
is a Japanese firm in which utility and profit maximization on the part of, respectively, employees 
and firm have been added.  Of course, the targets , , and Tx Ty Tz  are set by both Western firms 
and clans as those which maximize profits over all vectors  according to the method 
described previously.  The latter maximizing vectors in the Western firm and the clan are assumed 
to exist uniquely in each case. 
),,,( razy
Consider now a distinct internal equilibrium  in different sets E for each of the 
Western firm and the clan described above.  Such equilibria have been defined in general in Section 
I and hence apply directly to these two cases.  The following proposition follows immediately from 
previous definitions and assumptions. 
),( ra
 
Theorem 1.  Let fixed values of y and z be given and suppose the director’s rules impose no 
effective constraints on the selection of activities and rules by any worker.  Then in both Western 
firms and clans, internal equilibrium always maximizes profit over the set of all consistent  vectors 
, that is, over the relevant E.  Thus, with profit-maximizing  targets , , and ),( ra Tx Ty Tz , if the 
firm (director) sets  and Tyy = Tzz = , then employee selections of  ensure that  and 
hence that all targets are met. 
),( ra Txx =
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Theorem 1 has several implications. First, every  in the relevant E that is not profit 
maximizing must arise because the director’s rules exclude the profit-maximizing  from the 
options opened to employees.  Although logically possible, one would not expect the director’s 
rules in Western firms and clans to be so constituted.  Second, in each case, individual action 
results in profit maximization automatically without needing the director to dictate rules.  Even if 
all targets were met, Japanese firms do not, except by coincidence, operate at profit- and utility-
maximizing values of y, z, a, and r.  Hence, in this sense they are not generally as efficient as their 
Western counterparts.
),( ra
),( ra
9 
But there is still another sense in which efficiency escapes the Japanese firm.  This second 
kind of efficiency arises in relation to the notion of internal Pareto optimality (Gintis and Katzner 
[6, p. 280], and Katzner [10, p. 560]).  And inefficiency is present because, under the conditions 
that generally apply in the Japanese situation, it is possible, without any change in input quantities 
and without making anyone worse off, to expand output by reallocating activities and rules inside 
the firm, that is, by rearranging the social interaction among the firm's employees.  The argument is 
as follows: 
Let E be given along with y and z in the production function (1).  A vector 
 in E is called internally Pareto optimal in production as long as 
there is no other  in E such that 
),,,,,(),( 001
00
1
00
KK rraara KK=
),( ra
   
                                              ,  ),(),( 00 kk
k
kk
k raUraU ≥
 
for all , Kk ,,1K=
                                 
                                  , ),(),( 00 kk
k
kk
k raUraU >
  
for at least one , and Kk ,,1K=
                
                                            .   ),,,(),,,( 00 razyfrazyf ≥
                                                                 
Thus at an internal Pareto optimum, no reorganization of production in terms of activities and rules 
can make one employee better off, and no one else worse off, without lowering output.  If, for 
example, through the imposition  of rules, workers are not permitted to perform their jobs in ways 
in which they prefer, even though their preferred ways leads to the same output, then the  
obtained is not internally Pareto optimal.  Note that the director is not included in this notion of 
Pareto optimality and that the functions  and f are all taken to be given. 
),( ra
kU
Propositions asserting the internal Pareto optimality of internal equilibria in Western firms 
and clans are presented below.  In all cases, y and z are assumed fixed.  Only the proof of Theorem 
3 is outlined here; that of Theorem 2 is similar.10
 
Theorem 2.  Let the firm described in Section I be Western and suppose the director’s rules 
impose no effective constraints on the selection of activities and rules by any worker.  If ),( ra  is an 
internal equilibrium for the firm, then it is also internally Pareto optimal in production. 
 
 10
Theorem 3.  Let the firm described in Section I be a clan and suppose the director’s rules 
impose no effective constraints on the selection of activities and rules by any worker.  If ),( ra  is an 
internal equilibrium for the firm, then it is also internally Pareto optimal in production. 
  
               Proof:   
  
               Suppose ),,,,,(),( 11 KK rraara KK=  is an internal equilibrium in the appropriate 
E (given y and z).  Invoking Theorem 1 and the profit efficiency property that characterizes (in part) 
clans, ),( ra  also maximizes both profit and output.  If ),( ra  were not internally Pareto optimal, 
then there would exist a reorganization of production ),,,,,(),( 11 KK rraara KK=  in E such that   
 
(7)                                        ),(),( kkkkk
k raUraU > , 
 
for some employee k, and the levels of output and of utility of all other employees are no lower at 
 than at ),( ra ),( ra .  Now because the firm is a clan, all employees internalize the worth of 
productivity.  But applying the definition of internalizing the worth of productivity by employee k 
to (7) implies 11  
  
                                        ),,,(),,,( razyfrazyf > , 
                                                                
and this contradicts the maximality of output at ),( ra .  Therefore ),( ra  is internally Pareto optimal 
in production.  
                                                                                                                                        Q.E.D. 
 
Thus the clan, which, recall, is a Japanese firm to which maximization has been added, is 
efficient.  But without that latter addition, because neither the employees of the firm, nor the firm 
itself maximizes in their respective decision making, the Japanese firm cannot, in general, be 
expected to achieve internal Pareto optimality.  It should be pointed out, however, that the absence 
of efficiency in this sense, even when combined with that in the preceding sense derived from 
Theorem 1, does not necessarily threaten the survival of the firm.  This is due to the fact that 
mitigating circumstances and offsetting effects might be present.  Indeed, it has been argued 
elsewhere (Katzner [13]) that, in spite of inefficiencies like those elucidated here, offsets such as 
the presence of large quantities of unpaid labor, the bonus system with respect to which employees 
are remunerated, and a willingness to accept low rates of return on invested capital, permitted 
actual Japanese firms, which have many of the characteristics of the theoretical Japanese firm 
defined above, to lead the Japanese economy to almost 20 years of unprecedented growth during 
the decades following the Korean War. 
Finally, it is clear, and has been amply demonstrated above, that the theory of the firm is 
perfectly capable of expansion to include the possibility of variation across different cultures.  Such 
expansions, moreover, can be made sufficiently rich to permit the comparison of properties of firms 
that operate on the basis of distinct cultural backgrounds.  And adding these cultural dimensions to 
the theory of the firm provides, in many cases, more realistic and significant explanations of firm 
 11
behavior than those obtained by the forced imposition of irrelevant postulates of rationality as 
representative of the primary motivating impulse that drives individual and firm action. 
 
 
                                                                             Donald W. Katzner 
                                                                             University of Massachusetts/Amherst 
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Footnotes 
 
1. The author gratefully acknowledges the help of Douglas Vickers in the preparation of this 
paper.  
 
2. In general, of course, rationality in decision making can be said to exist in the absence of 
self interest and maximization.  But for purposes of present discussion, it will be convenient to refer 
to action as derived from self interest, and only that action, as being both rational and satisfying 
postulates of rationality or maximization.  
                                                                      
3. The definition of an activity would normally include a statement or an implication 
regarding the length of time necessary to perform that activity.  And this, in turn, suggests a relation 
between  and .  The latter relation, however, lies beyond the scope of present discussion, and 
will be ignored.  
kz ka
 
4. The presence of real capital assets among the components of y could be taken to imply 
that the model, in making y a decision variable, is determining an instantaneous optimal structure 
for the firm.  Analytically, that raises the question as to whether employees’ choices of activities 
and rules remain constant throughout the lives of the assets.  But this problem is set aside and not 
considered in subsequent discussion.  
                            
5. The determination of  in (2) and its relation to the labor market is disregarded.  kW
 
6. This concept was referred to in Gintis and Katzner [6, p. 284] and Katzner [10, p. 557] as 
“internalizing the values of the firm.”  As noted momentarily, it is a special case of a more general 
notion that is given the latter name below.  
                                       
7. The Western firm was called a “bureaucracy” by  Ouchi [15, p. 134] and Katzner [10, p. 
558].  
 
8. The fact that it is technically possible for a firm to be, at the same time, both Western and 
a clan is irrelevant for present argument.  See Katzner [10, p. 558n].  
                                       
9. For further discussion of this and related kinds of inefficiency in Japanese firms, see 
Katzner [13].  
                                                  
10. A proof may be found in Katzner [10, pp. 561-562]. 
 
11. Recall that underlying the notion of internalizing the worth of productivity is the 
assumption that all vectors  can be compared, as previously indicated, in relation to the 
firm’s output. 
),( kk ra
